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1 Introduction
Rent taxation influences resource allocation through various channels. Feldstein (1977) shows
that a rent tax promotes capital accumulation. The rent tax lowers the price of the fixed
factor (e.g. land), which reallocates a higher fraction of savings in the households portfolio
choice to the accumulation of physical capital. Consequently, welfare of steady state gen-
erations rises.1 The effect is of course non-existent in a small open economy in which the
household portfolio choice and domestic capital accumulation are disconnected (e.g. Eaton,
1988). As recently shown by Petrucci (2006), rent taxation may still be beneficial in a small
open economy provided households endogenously supply labor. For instance, when rent tax
revenues are spent on the reduction of distortionary wage taxes, labor supply increases; an
effect which is welcomed by steady state generations. They enjoy a lower wage tax without
incurring a drop in the price of their land holdings. The latter cost of rent taxation is borne
by transitional generations.
This paper analyzes whether the positive effects of rent taxation extend to transitional
generations. We show that, provided the initially prevailing level of wage taxes is sufficiently
high, introducing rent taxes to reduce wage taxes increases the sum of rental income and
land value of the transitional generation. The rationale is that the rise in labor supply raises
the marginal productivity of land which capitalizes in the market price of land. As such,
earmarking rent tax revenues is helpful in realizing an intergenerational Pareto-improvement.
Rent taxation induces a forward intergenerational transfer from transitional generations to
steady state generations. The earmarking simultaneously yields a backward, market-based
reaction in asset values, which compensates, possibly to a full extent transitional generations.
1Among others, Calvo et al. (1979), Chamley and Wright (1987) and Ihori (1990) analyze refinements of
the effect.
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2 The Model
Consider a small open economy whose population size is normalized at unity. In any period
t production combines three input factors: capital, labor and land. The amount of land is
normalized to unity. Labor and capital in the economy in period t are denoted by Lt and Kt,
respectively. The production function Yt = F (Lt, Kt) exhibits constant returns to scale in all
three factors. Capital is internationally mobile. All markets are competitive, and therefore
profit maximization implies that:
wt = FLt(Lt,Kt), r = FKt(Lt, Kt). (1)
wt denotes the wage rate in period t and r is the exogenous world interest rate. The land
rent in period t, Rt, is given as residual
Rt = F (Lt, Kt)− FLt(Lt, Kt)Lt − FKt(Lt, Kt)Kt. (2)
Individuals can invest their savings in the international capital market or the national
land market. The economy produces a composite good, which is a perfect substitute for that
produced abroad. Rents are taxed at a rate τR < 1. By arbitrage, land value in period t,
Vt, is given by
(1 + r)Vt = (1− τ
R)Rt+1 + Vt+1. (3)
Recursive substitution yields:
Vt =
∞∑
i=1
(1− τR)Rt+i
(1 + r)i
. (4)
We analyze an overlapping generations model in which each cohort lives for two periods.
Since each cohort consists of homogenous households, we consider a representative household
for each cohort. In the first period of their life individuals born in period t choose their labor
supply lt and savings invested in financial assets st and land acquisition Vt from the old
generation. In the second period of life, individuals receive the rent payment Rt+1, sell
land to the current young generation and use the receipts along with the deaccumulation
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of financial assets st(1 + r) to finance second-period consumption c
2
t+1. In addition to the
rent tax τR, the government imposes a tax τw on wage income. The first and second period
budget constraint thus are
(1− τw)ltwt − c
1
t − st − Vt = 0 (5)
st(1 + r) + (1− τ
R)Rt+1 + Vt+1 − c
2
t+1 = 0. (6)
Household utility is
U(1− lt, c
1
t , c
2
t+1) = c
1
t + ρ ln c
2
t+1 −
γ
1 + γ
l
1+γ
γ
t ρ, γ > 0. (7)
Households can save and borrow freely at the exogenous interest rate r, determined by
the international capital market in order to smoothen their consumption over their lifetime.
Labor supply of the young in period t follows from maximizing (7) subject to the budget
constraints (5) and (6) which yields
lt = ((1− τ
w)wt)
γ .
dlt/dwt > 0 since income effects on labor supply are absent. The elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate is equal to γ.
Land price dynamics are captured by (3). Rearranging terms, all “price-dividend” ratios
consistent with arbitrage behavior must satisfy
(1 + r)
Vt
Rt
= (1− τR) +
Vt+1
Rt+1
. (8)
(8) defines the function Vt+1
Rt+1
= φ
(
Vt
Rt
)
with φ′ > 1. Therefore, a steady state Vt
Rt
= Vt+1
Rt+1
exists. Also, the steady state is unique and exhibits point stability. Using (4) the time path
of land value is characterized by
Vt =
(1− τR)Rt+1
r
. (9)
Any change in land value following a tax reform in period t is captured by a jump in land
rents in the subsequent period. Finally, we note that the net foreign assets of the economy in
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period t, Ft, satisfy the transversality condition lim
T→∞
(
1
1+r
)T
Ft+T+1 = 0 as each generation’s
budget constraint is satisfied over its lifetime and r > 0.
3 Rent Tax Reform
We consider a rise in rent taxes at the beginning of period t; before the young generation
supplies labor and the current elderly sell their land to the young generation. The proceeds
are used to reduce the wage tax. The current young cohort and the newly born generations
benefit from the tax reform. They are subject to a lower wage tax and trade land at the
new steady state price. The current old cohort experiences a change in the value of land
holdings. To verify whether it is a gain or loss, we first define labor demand, capital demand
and the wage rate as a function of the wage tax. The first-order condition for capital demand
defines Lt(Kt) and following (2) Rt(Kt). Via the first-order condition for labor demand, we
get wt(Kt). Inserting Lt(Kt) and wt(Kt) into the labor market clearing condition yields
Lt(Kt) = lt((1− τ
w)wt(Kt)) which defines Kt(τ
w). The slope of the various functions is2
dLt
dKt
=
−FKK
FKL
,
dRt
dKt
=
Lt∆
FKL
,
dwt
dKt
=
−∆
FKL
and
dKt
dτw
=
wt(Kt)l
′
t
l′t(1− τ
w)dwt/dKt − dLt/dKt
,
(10)
where ∆ := FKKFLL − F
2
KL > 0. The public sector budget constraint is Tt = τ
wwtLt +
τRRt. Keeping tax revenues constant, tax rates are related as
dτw
dτR
∣∣∣∣
dTt=0
= −
∂Tt/∂τ
R
∂Tt/∂τw
(11)
with
∂Tt
∂τR
= Rt > 0 and
∂Tt
∂τw
= wtLt + τ
wLt
dwt
dτw
+ τwwt
dLt
dτw
+ τR
dRt
dτw
. (12)
We assume that the economy is on the up-ward sloping part of the tax revenue hill, ∂Tt/∂τ
w >
0. Using (11), (12) and (9) and invoking stationarity of land rents (Rt+1 = Rt) we can com-
pute
2
l
′
t
denotes the derivative of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate (1− τw)wt.
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d
(
(1− τR)Rt + Vt
)
dτR
∣∣∣∣∣
dTt=0
= −
(1 + r)Rt
r
(
1 +
(
1− τR
)
dRt/dτ
w
∂Tt/∂τw
)
. (13)
The transition generation benefits from the tax reform if and only if (13) is positive.
Resorting to a Cobb-Douglas production function with α and β (α, β > 0, α+ β < 1) being
the share of output accruing to labor and capital, we find:
Proposition. Consider an economy in which ∂Tt/∂τ
w > 0. There always exists an
interval of wage tax rates (τw, τw), τw < τw and τw, τw ∈ (0, 1), in which changing the tax
mix from wage to rent taxation improves welfare of the transition generation.
Proof. First, assume ∂Tt/∂τ
w > 0. Inserting (12) into (13) a necessary and sufficient
condition for d
(
(1− τR)Rt + Vt
)
/dτR
∣∣
dTt=0
> 0 is3
wtLt + τ
wLt
dwt
dτw
+ τwwt
dLt
dτw
+
dRt
dτw
< 0. (14)
Using (10) and evaluating the various terms for a Cobb-Douglas production function,
(14) holds if and only if
τw > τw :=
1− β − (1− α− β)ω
1− β + ωα
, ω :=
γ (1− β)
1− β + γ (1− α− β)
. (15)
The assumption ∂Tt/∂τ
w > 0 holds if and only if
τw < τw :=
1− β − τR (1− α− β)ω
1− β + ωα
. (16)
Straightforwardly, τw < τw as τR < 1. We next prove that τw, τw ∈ (0, 1). Observe
that by (15) and (16) di
dω
dω
dγ
< 0, i = τw, τw. Furthermore, (15) implies limγ→0 τ
w = 1 and
limγ→∞ τ
w = 0. Following (16) limγ→0 τ
w = 1 and limγ→∞ τ
w =
(1−τR)(1−α−β)
1−β
∈ (0, 1).Thus,
τw, τw ∈ (0, 1) which completes the proof.
A rent tax lowers the land value and rental income, ceteris paribus. The budget-balancing
reduction in labor taxes, however, increases land productivity in the current and future
3The subsequent proof omits intermediate steps in computing (14), (15) and (16). A detailed proof is in
the appendix.
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periods. This capitalizes in the land price and may compensate for the negative effect of
higher rent taxation, together with the current increase in land rents. In fact, a pre-existing
labor tax τw > τw generates a sufficiently large distortion in the economy (being convex in
the tax rate) so as to render the net effect on land value and rental income positive. The tax
reform thereby raises welfare of the transition generation and of steady state generations.
The upper bound τw ensures that ∂Tt/∂τ
w > 0. Straightforwardly, for a level of wage taxes
above τw (and thus ∂Tt/∂τ
w < 0) it is feasible to lower both the wage and rent tax while
leaving tax revenues constant. As a result, current and future generations benefit from the
reform. To illustrate the scope for intergenerationally welfare-enhancing policies, consider(
α, β, γ, τR
)
= (0.6, 0.3, 0.5, 0.1). When evaluated subject to the condition ∂Tt/∂τ
w > 0 the
range of wage tax rates which sustain a Pareto-improvement is (τw, τw) = (0.67, 0.71). The
interval extends to unity in the absence of the condition.
4 Concluding Remarks
The paper shows that rent taxation, when combined with a budget-balancing reduction in
wage taxes, may also benefit transitional generations. The commonality of interest between
transitional generations and steady state generations becomes weaker when considering al-
ternative fiscal uses of rent tax revenues. For instance, a lump-sum transfer of rent tax
receipts to steady state generations is still welcome by them (Petrucci, 2006), but eliminates
the market based adjustment in land values in the absence of income effects on labor sup-
ply and induces a further downward adjustment of land values when leisure is normal in
consumption. We leave a rigorous analysis of alternative uses of rent tax revenues to future
research.
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5 Appendix
The appendix contains a detailed proof of the Proposition. For notational simplicity, we
omit the time subscript throughout.
Inserting (12) into (13) and invoking stationarity
d
(
(1− τR)R+ V
)
dτR
∣∣∣∣∣
dT=0
= −
(1 + r)R
r
(
1 +
(
1− τR
)
dR
dτw
wL+ τwL dw
dτw
+ τww dL
dτw
+ τR dR
dτw
)
= −
(1 + r)R
r
(
wL+ τwL dw
dτw
+ τww dL
dτw
+ τR dR
dτw
+
(
1− τR
)
dR
dτw
wL+ τwL dw
dτw
+ τww dL
dτw
+ τR dR
dτw
)
= −
(1 + r)R
r
(
wL+ τwL dw
dτw
+ τww dL
dτw
+ dR
dτw
wL+ τwL dw
dτw
+ τww dL
dτw
+ τR dR
dτw
)
. (17)
Assuming ∂T/∂τw = wL + τwL dw
dτw
+ τww dL
dτw
+ τR dR
dτw
> 0, a necessary and sufficient
condition for (17) to be positive is
wL+ τwL
dw
dτw
+ τww
dL
dτw
+
dR
dτw
< 0.
Using the chain rule the condition reads
wL+
(
τwL
dw
dK
+ τww
dL
dK
+
dR
dK
)
dK
dτw
< 0. (18)
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Evaluating the responses di
dK
, i = w,L,K (see (10)) for the Cobb-Douglas production
function Y = LαKβ
(18) = αLαKβ +
(
τww
1− β
α
L
K
+ (1− τw) (1− α− β)LαKβ−1
)
dK
dτw
(19)
Inserting w = αLα−1Kβ and collecting terms
(19) = αLαKβ + (τw (1− β) + (1− τw) (1− α− β))LαKβ−1
dK
dτw
. (20)
Using the first-order condition for capital demand, r = βLαKβ−1, to substitute for K,
and rearranging yields
(20) = α
(
β
r
) β
1−β
L
α
1−β + (1− α− β + τwα)
(
β
r
)
−1
dK
dτw
. (21)
We decompose dK
dτw
into dK
dL
dL
dτw
. By the first-order condition r = βLαKβ−1 we have
dK
dL
=
α
1− β
(
β
r
) 1
1−β
L
α
1−β
−1. (22)
Furthermore, labor supply is l = ((1− τw)wt)
γ . Substituting w by the first-order condition
w = αLα−1Kβ and, subsequently, K by the (inverted) first-order condition r = βLαKβ−1,
l =
(
(1− τw)α
(
β
r
) β
1−β
L
α
1−β
−1
)γ
.
Setting l = L and solving for L yields
L =
(
(1− τw)α
(
β
r
) β
1−β
)ω
, ω :=
γ (1− β)
1− β + γ (1− α− β)
.
Taking the derivative
dL
dτw
= −ω
(
(1− τw)α
(
β
r
) β
1−β
)ω−1
α
(
β
r
) β
1−β
= −ω
1
1− τw
L. (23)
Inserting (22) and (23) into (21) we get
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(21) = α
(
β
r
) β
1−β
L
α
1−β − (1− α− β + τwα)
(
β
r
)
−1
α
1− β
(
β
r
) 1
1−β
L
α
1−β
−1ω
1
1− τw
L
= α
(
β
r
) β
1−β
L
α
1−β − (1− α− β + τwα)
α
1− β
(
β
r
) β
1−β
L
α
1−βω
1
1− τw
= α
(
β
r
) β
1−β
L
α
1−β
(
1− (1− α− β + τwα)
1
1− β
ω
1
1− τw
)
.
Recall, provided ∂T/∂τw > 0 the sum of rental income and land value of the transitional
generation increases, d
(
(1− τR)Rt + Vt
)
/dτR
∣∣
dTt=0
> 0, if and only if
1− (1− α− β + τwα)
1
1− β
ω
1
1− τw
< 0. (24)
Equivalently stated,
τw > τw :=
1− β − (1− α− β)ω
1− β + ωα
, ω :=
γ (1− β)
1− β + γ (1− α− β)
. (25)
We next derive the condition under which
∂T
∂τw
= wL+ τwL
dw
dτw
+ τww
dL
dτw
+ τR
dR
dτw
> 0
holds. As can be inferred from (17) the expression is almost congruent to the term
wL + τwL dw
dτw
+ τww dL
dτw
+ dR
dτw
which we stepwise rearranged to arrive at (25). Reiterating
the same steps, the condition for ∂Tt/∂τ
w > 0 reads
τw < τw :=
1− β − τR (1− α− β)ω
1− β + ωα
, ω :=
γ (1− β)
1− β + γ (1− α− β)
.
Straightforwardly, τw < τw when τR < 1. A change in the tax mix from wage to rent
taxation increases land value if and only if τw ∈ (τw, τw).
Helpful in proving that τw, τw ∈ (0, 1) we first compute the derivative
dω
dγ
=
(1− β) (1− β + γ (1− α− β)− γ (1− α− β))
(1− β + γ (1− α− β))2
=
(1− β)2
(1− β + γ (1− α− β))2
> 0.
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Turning to the slope of τw the with respect to ω
dτw
dω
=
− (1− α− β) (1− β + ωα)− (1− β − (1− α− β)ω)α
(1− (1− ω)α)2
=
− (1− β)2
(1− (1− ω)α)2
< 0.
Similarly,
dτw
dω
=
−τR (1− α− β) (1− β + ωα)−
(
1− β − τR (1− α− β)ω
)
α
(1− (1− ω)α)2
=
− (1− β)
(
α+ τR (1− α− β)
)
(1− (1− ω)α)2
< 0.
Therefore,
di
dω
dω
dγ
< 0, i = τw, τw.
To determine the maximal and minimal value of τw and τw, we first observe that
lim
γ→0
ω = 0 (26)
and applying L’Hôpital’s rule
lim
γ→∞
ω =
1− β
1− α− β
. (27)
Given by (26) and (27)
lim
γ→0
τw = 1 and lim
γ→∞
τw = 0
and
lim
γ→0
τw = 1 and lim
γ→∞
τw =
(
1− τR
)
(1− α− β)
1− β
∈ (0, 1).
Thus, τw, τw ∈ (0, 1) which completes the proof.
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